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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals several discovery rulings and a ruling on attorney's fees in this 
case resulting from a final jury verdict. This Court has jurisdiction under URAP Rule 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's Motion To 
Compel Discovery and Motions to Extend Discovery? 
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals should review this issue under an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. 
Citation to Record of Issue Preservation. Trial Record (TR) 85-107, 166-167, 290-
291. 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Issue. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to the 
Plaintiff as the prevailing party in the lawsuit; and if not, were the fees properly charged 
and allocated? 
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals should review this issue under an 
abuse of discretion standard of review. 
Citation to Record of Issue Preservation. TR 644-711. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
There are no such citations of central importance to the appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a construction and roofing contract. The Plaintiff contracted 
to provide a roof to the Defendant. Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff constructed the 
roof improperly and also during construction committed various civil torts. During the 
course of the litigation Defendant sought to recuse the Trial Judge. The Defendant's 
counsel had several cases with the Judge Lindberg and believed that she could not 
impartially rule upon any matters in which he was the counsel. He therefore sought her 
recusal prior to advancing the litigation. He was eventually successful in doing so. 
However, prior to her recusal, she denied Defendant's Motion to Compel and 
invited Defendant to redraft discovery after the discovery deadline had passed. Plaintiff 
therefor refused to engage in further discovery. These procedural actions, along with 
settlement negotiations and Plaintiffs untimely production of discovery, caused 
considerable delay and Defendant was unable to prepare for trial and sought to extend 
discovery. The request was denied and the matter went to trial. The jury returned a 
verdict of $4200 for Defendant and approximately $31,000 for Plaintiff. Thereafter, 
without requiring the allocation of fees, and without scrutinizing double billed fees, and 
eliminating fees for unnecessary legal work, the Trial Court granted Plaintiff all 
attorney's fees requested. 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The matter commenced on April 19, 2002 when Plaintiff filed and served its 
2 
complaint. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. Soon thereafter 
the parties engaged in settlement discussions, discovery, and Defendant sought to recuse 
the Trial Judge. The Trial Judge recused herself in July of 2003 and a new Trial Judge 
was assigned. The matter went to trial on December 11, 2003 and resulted in a mixed 
jury verdict for both parties. Attorney's fees were then awarded Plaintiff and this appeal 
ensued. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
1. On April 19, 2002, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging Breach of 
Contract and Unjust Enrichment. He alleged that Defendant had agreed to pay "for 
materials and services," owed "$25,906, plus, as provided in the Contract, a 10% 
surcharge," and 18% interest. The dispute arose out of a roofing project that Plaintiff 
contracted to complete. Trial Record (TR) 1-4. 
2. Defendant/appellant counterclaimed alleging Material Breach of Contract, 
Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, Trespass and Conversion. 
Defendant alleged that Plaintiff and its agents failed to perform their work in a competent 
manner, caused damage, interfered with its parking area, failed to properly hire, train and 
supervise its employees who caused waste, damage and privacy violations. TR 14-17. 
3. During the course of this litigation through the day of trial, the Plaintiff 
disputed all causes of action asserted by Defendant including the assertion that he had 
caused damage to Defendant's air-conditioning units. The sole exception was that at trial, 
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Plaintiff conceded it had damaged Defendant's air conditioning units. TR 18-20. 
4. On August 26, 2002, Defendant sent a discovery request to Plaintiff TR 
72-73. In this discovery request, in addition to other information, Defendant requested 
the following: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Provide the last known names and numbers 
of any business entities, governmental agencies, persons who have ever had any 
complaints, concerns, lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues regarding any of the 
supplies, workmanship, or services provided by Plaintiff or its agents to any 
persons or businesses or other legal entities. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Provide the party names, the name of the court 
and docket numbers of lawsuits or administrative actions filed against Plaintiff or 
its agents because of any of its business practices or because of its services, 
materials or workmanship. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Has Plaintiff or its agents ever been convicted 
of any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: If your answer to the preceding interrogatory 
is "yes," please provide the following: 
a. The charge, 
b. The court; 
c. The docket number of the case. 
REQUEST NO, 5: Please produce a copy of each and every document 
stating the amount that Plaintiff charged Defendant for the work performed, 
including but not limited to bills, invoices, and other similar documents. 
REQUEST NO.6: Please produce a copy of each of the personnel files, 
wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either employees or 
independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to 
Defendant. 
PiEOUESTNO. 12: Please produce a copy of each and every document, 
recording, photograph, or other item evidencing any complaints, concerns, 
lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues regarding any of the supplies, workmanship, or 
services provided by Plaintiff or its agents to any persons or businesses or other 
legal entities. TR 86-87 
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5. Except for Request (for Documents) 5, Plaintiffs response, sent four and a 
half months late (TR 84), to all of these discovery requests above was: 
Plaintiff objects to this [interrogatory or request] as being vague, ambiguous, over 
broad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and beyond the scope of discovery 
permitted by Rule because it requests information that is not relevant to the subject 
matter of the pending litigation and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence at trial. TR 99-107. 
6. Pursuant to the Trial Court's Scheduling Order, the discovery deadline was 
January 30, 2003 (TR 30). No additional discovery, except on expert witnesses could go 
forward without an extension of the discovery deadline. 
7. On February 3, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel discovery. TR 
85-91. 
8. The Trial Judge, on March 31, 2003 denied Defendant's Motion to Compel 
stating: 
12. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that [Interrogatory No.2], as presently 
structured, is vague and overbroad. It is possible, however, that Defendant may be 
able to narrow and define this discovery request by using time limits and language 
that limits the information requested to that reasonably calculated to lead to 
admissible evidence under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b). 
14. The Court again agrees with Plaintiff that [Interrogatory No.3] is vague and 
overbroad. Arguably, this particular request could be narrowed by providing 
reasonable time limits to the request and limiting the request to causes of action 
that relate to the claims Defendant has made against Plaintiff. 
16. In support of its [Interrogatory No. 4 and 5] Defendant argues that information 
regarding a witness' honesty is always relevant for establishing credibility. 
Nevertheless, this discovery request is not limited to those who may be called as 
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witnesses, but appears to apply to any employee of Plaintiff. See Utah R. Evid. 
609. Upon identification of those persons who are likely to appear as witnesses at 
trial, Defendant might be able to provide a narrower construction of this discovery 
request. 
19. In Request No.6, Defendant asks Plaintiff to "produce a copy of each of the 
personnel files, wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either 
employees or independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or 
materials to Defendant." Defendant asserts, without support, that this information 
is necessary for it to maintain its counterclaims. While some of these documents 
arguably may be relevant, as it is currently drafted, the request is over broad. 
21. [Request No. 12], appears to be substantively related to Interrogatory No.2. As 
the Court has already concluded with respect to the prior request, see supra ffi|10-
12, this request is also vague. Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or 
entity that has ever had a "concern" or "problem" against it. Additionally, the scope 
of this discovery request appears to encompass situations not related to 
Defendant's claims for negligent employment or material breach of contract. 
(Exhibit A and TR 162-163). 
9. Due to Plaintiffs delay in submitting discovery, settlement discussions and 
the trial Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel, on April 24, 2003 Defendant requested 
an extension of the Discovery cut off deadlines that had passed. TR 166-167. 
10. On May 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. TR 
223. 
11. Again, due to Plaintiffs delay in submitting discovery, settlement 
discussions the trial Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel, the recusal Motions to 
recuse the Trial Judge, and because of an intent to submit a modified discovery request 
pursuant to the Trial Judge's denial of its Motion to Compel, on May 7, 2003, Defendant 
renewed its request for an extension of the Discovery cut off deadlines that had passed, 
requested oral argument thereon, and submitted to Plaintiff the discovery questions it 
sought to have the Plaintiff respond to. TR 290-291, 
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12. On April 14, 2003, Plaintiff refused to respond to discovery or submit to a 
deposition because the discovery cut off deadline had passed. TR 447 ^ 7, 543 ^ 5. 
13. On May 15, 2003, Defendant objected to the certificate of readiness for trial 
and requested oral argument. TR 295. 
14. On May 29, 2003, Defendant notified the court by affidavit that all but one 
address given by Plaintiff in his discovery responses regarding potential witnesses were 
incorrect or no longer valid. TR 299-300. 
15. On July 3, 2003, Judge Denise Lindberg recused herself from the case. TR 
306 
16. On August 6, 2003, the case was assigned to Judge Timothy R. Hanson. 
TR308. 
17. On August 28, 2003, the Trial Judge, by telephone conference, without 
requiring a written motion, granted Plaintiff the right to make an untimely response to 
Defendant's requests for an extension of discovery and set another telephone conference 
to address and decide the matter on October 7, 2003. TR 315, 447 If 8, 543 ^ 6. 
18. However, on October 6, 2003, one day prior to the scheduled telephone 
conference for oral argument, the Trial Judge issued an order denying Defendant's 
request stating: 
. . . The court notes that the Defendant requests a hearing on this Request 
for Extension. However, since the Request... is not a dispositive motion and 
since the parties' written submissions adequately represent their respective legal 
positions, the Court declines to schedule this matter for hearing. Therefore,... the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
The Defendant seeks to extend the January 30, 2002 (sic-2003), discovery 
deadline on the basis that discovery in this matter has been delayed by settlement 
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negotiations, the filing of recusal requests and the filing of Motion to Compel. Of 
these, only the pendency of a motion to compel could have potentially hindered 
discovery from progressing. However, while the Motion to Compel was decided 
on March 31, 2003, the Defendant (for unknown reasons) has taken no further 
steps to complete its discovery in the months following. Furthermore, as the 
Plaintiff accurately describes in his opposition, this case has already been unduly 
delayed and the Defendant had not articulated an adequate basis to delay it further. 
Accordingly, having considered the Defendant's Request, the Court denies the 
same. Exhibit B--TR 325-326, 347-348. 
19. Although they were requested in discovery, Plaintiff conceded during the 
trial that he had failed to provide, in response to discovery, any invoices pertinent to the 
project. TR 753^4. 
20. On December 11, 2003, Defendant's causes of action for Material Breach 
of Contract, Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, Trespass and 
Conversion were submitted to the Jury. TR 573. 
21. The Jury returned a General Verdict in favor of Defendant for $4,200 and 
returned another General Verdict for Plaintiff for $31,865. TR 610-611. 
22. As a result of this verdict Plaintiff by affidavit requested an award of 
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $20,329. TR 615-625 
23. Defendant submitted a counter affidavit for attorney's fees, contesting 
Plaintiffs affidavit of attorney's fees as excessive, and asserting that Defendant was the 
prevailing party. Defendant further argued that, besides not properly allocating fees 
between claims, requested fees were: (1) double billed, (2) billed for consultation among 
attorneys, (3) billed for time spent unsuccessfully defending against Defendant's 
counterclaims, (4) and billed for matters that Plaintiff did not pursue, withdrew or was 
unsuccessful in pursuing. TR 644-659, 667-670. 
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24. Among others, Defendant specifically challenged the following entries on 
Plaintiffs bill for attorney's fees. TR 661-665. 
A. Double billing and attorney consultations between attorneys Sorensen 
(RLS), Greg Hawkins (GPH) and Lonn Litchfield (LL) are found at entry 
numbers: 3-9, 14, 18, 27, and 33. 
B. Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment are not complex. To 
research and draft the complaint, Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total of 7.2 hours at 
entries 4-7. This time is excessive. 
C. To research and draft an answer and reply to Defendant's counterclaim, 
Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total of 8.6 hours at entries 8-12. This time is 
excessive. 
D. Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged Defendant's motion to recuse Judge 
Lindberg, Plaintiffs attorneys billed at total of 12.8 hours at entries 25-29. 
Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time for a Motion to Dismiss that was never filed by 
Plaintiff and prepared documentation for settlement of the case. No such 
documents were ever agreed upon by the parties. These are at entries 8, 35. 
E. Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time in its unsuccessful challenge to strike 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery at entries 43-44, 48. Plaintiffs Motion 
to Strike was frivolous. Plaintiffs attorney asserted that Defendant had not 
consulted with him prior to filing its Motion to Compel. Plaintiffs attorney's own 
billing entries demonstrate that such correspondence in fact occurred. After 
presenting proof thereof, Judge Lindberg found this claim to be unfounded and 
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denied the Motion to Strike. 
F. In this matter Defendant's attorney's staff contacted Judge Lindberg's 
clerk to determine whether or not a proper jury demand and fee had been paid. 
They were informed that it had not. Therefore Mr. Lambert filed a Rule 39 (b) 
request for a jury. Rather than simply inform Mr. Lambert of its jury request and 
payment, the opposing attorney prepared an objection to the request and billed for 
this objection at entry 51. This was completely unnecessary. 
G. Plaintiffs attorneys double billed for time spent drafting a Rule 11 letter 
to Mr. Lambert threatening him with sanctions that were never imposed at entries 
53-54. 
H. Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time for preparing, on the eve of trial, 
several motions, including a Motion to Strike and Motion for Order to Preclude 
New Evidence at entries 61, 64-65. These Motions were frivolous and were 
withdrawn by Plaintiff after Defendant had spent considerable time responding to 
them and filing counter motions demonstrating their lack of foundation. 
25. The Trial Judge, without engaging in any factual or legal analysis, ruled 
Defendant's objection to attorney's fees stating, among other conclusory findings, 
. . . Under the case law recited in the Defendant's brief, it is undoubtable that the 
Plaintiff prevailed on the significant issues in this litigation and that the 
Defendant's success (both in terms of monetary recovery and legal issues 
presented) was nominal. 
. . . Having reviewed these specific entries, the Court concludes that the 
Defendant's objections are without merit and that a reduction in the fees is 
unwarranted. In fact, a number of the Defendant's objections are based on the 
invalid argument that simply because a particular motion or legal endeavor 
pursued by the Plaintiff was eventually unsuccessful, there should be no recovery 
for the time attributable thereto. However, it is the overall outcome that is 
determinative of prevailing party status and attorney fee recovery and not the 
success of each individual motion or legal effort. TR 772-773. 
26. The facts supporting the Trial Judge granting of attorney's fees are that 
Plaintiff was awarded all of his requested contractual damages plus interest and a 10% 
penalty minus the $4,200 awarded the Defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by failing to compel Plaintiff to answer 
discovery requests that were reasonably calculated to lead to evidence about Plaintiff and 
his potential witnesses' credibility, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, competency, work customs, and job performance. The requested discovery 
was reasonably calculated to lead to the whereabouts of Plaintiff s employees that worked 
on Defendant's roof on behalf of Plaintiff. 
The Trial Judge denied Defendant's Motion to Compel on March 31, 2003 after 
the discovery cut off deadline had passed, but invited Defendant to redraft its requests to 
conform to its ruling. The Plaintiff however, refused to engage in further discovery 
because of the lapse of the discovery deadline. Defendant then moved to extend 
discovery. A Trial Judge abused his discretion when he denied the request stating that the 
Defendant had no excuse for not having completed discovery after March 31, 2003. 
Rushed into trial, the Defendant was awarded a $4,200 general jury verdict which 
offset the Plaintiffs general jury verdict of $31,000. Plaintiffs contract allowed an 
award of attorney's fees if he had to pursue collection efforts. The Trial Judge awarded 
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Plaintiff his attorney's fees but failed to make any analysis of his decision except that the 
monetary award to Defendant was nominal. Defendant asserts that the Trial Judge did not 
analyze the contractual language, the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., 
brought by the parties, the importance of the claims relative to each other and their 
significance in the context of the lawsuit. Had he done so and juxtaposed these factors 
against the factor he gave the most importance to-that being the dollar amounts awarded 
to the parties-he may have realized that the Defendant should have been deemed the 
prevailing party. 
Alternatively, no fees and costs should have been awarded to either side, or 
Plaintiff attorneys' fees should have been substantially reduced. Plaintiff did not allocate 
fees between claims for which there was no entitlement to attorney fees and for claims for 
which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees for time expended on each. Moreover, 
the fees billed were a result of inefficiency and an excessive, unreasonable number of 
hours spent on the case and for redundant and unnecessary work. This is evidenced by 
many frivolous, withdrawn, unsuccessful, non-meritorious motions filed by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs attorney also requested payment for expenses that were duplicated due to 
several attorneys being involved in the same matter. 
Lastly, Plaintiffs attorney increased the expense of the litigation by delaying for 
trial Plaintiffs concession that he had damaged Defendant's air cooling units. Plaintiff 
made an untimely disclosure of a few invoices at trial for materials allegedly integrated 
into the roof when they had been requested in discovery. These actions were in bad faith 
and in violation with the Civil Rules of Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO EXTEND DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO COMPEL? 
Discovery is allowed so long as the requested discovery, "appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." URCP Rule 26(b)(1). The 
key is not that something may ultimately be inadmissible or that the discovery net that is 
cast is "unduly broad" because it may capture inadmissible or irrelevant information. 
Also, there is no per se rule that requires a litigant to so narrowly craft its requests that 
only relevant, admissible evidence is produced. Nor must the litigant allow the 
opposing/responding party to decide and dictate what is or is not relevant before it 
responds to discovery. 
Moreover, it is axiomatic that a potential witness' credibility is always a relevant 
issue of inquiry in discovery. State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989). It is also true that 
while character evidence is generally inadmissible, prior bad acts "may, however, be 
admissible" to show, "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." URE Rule 404(b). In other words evidence 
offered under URE Rule 404(b) "is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose 
and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403." 
In this case Defendant had alleged that Plaintiff had failed to perform under its 
contract with Defendant and that he had negligently hired, trained and supervised his 
employees. Defendant more specifically alleged that the Plaintiff and his employees 
provided shoddy workmanship, substandard materials and caused both negligent and 
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intentional damage to the Creekside premises and its property. Defendant further alleged 
that Plaintiffs employees exposed themselves to Creekside habitants, urinated in full 
view of Creekside residents, and soiled the premises. These actions resulted in waste, 
destruction of property, nuisance and an invasion of privacy. The jury in fact awarded 
Defendant $4,200 for these causes of action. 
Given these allegations, all discovery requests were proper that were reasonably 
calculated to net information or locate witnesses that could demonstrate that Plaintiff 
knew and in fact had negligently hired, trained and supervised his employees, had 
provided shoddy, incompetent workmanship, substandard materials, had caused both 
negligent and intentional damage to the Creekside premises and its property, or had 
violated the Defendant's privacy. Furthermore, all discovery requests were proper that 
were reasonably calculated to net information that impeached Plaintiff, its employees and 
potential witnesses' credibility. 
Defendant's Interrogatories #2 and #3 and Request (for Documents) #12 sought 
information that was reasonably calculated to locate other persons or entities that had had 
similar complaints or legal actions as those of Defendant against any Plaintiff regarding 
its supplies, workmanship, or services. In its Motion to Compel, Defendant indicated that 
it had heard rumors that other customers of Plaintiff had encountered the same problems 
it alleged against the Plaintiff: i.e., poor workmanship, hiring unskilled workers, using 
substandard materials and not complying with his contractual obligations. This comment 
was made not as evidentiary proof thereof, but to explain why it had propounded these 
discovery requests and to show what it hoped to discover. 
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Apparently, the Trial Judge believed that before evidence can be requested in 
discovery a litigant must first prove the evidence exists. (See Judge's note at TR 126, 
"based on what"). This is not the law. 
As argued in its Motion to Compel, Plaintiff through his pleadings and at trial 
represented himself as an honest, skilled, highly-qualified professional roofer who used 
good workmanship, skilled workers, and appropriate materials. The information sought 
may have revealed that Plaintiff or his employees had, on prior occasions, engaged in 
tortious acts. Such reports or information may have been admissible to show "proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident," and to show that Defendant knew or should have known his employees were 
unskilled and committing torts on the premises of customers and that his roofs were being 
installed in a faulty manner with substandard materials, or to attack his credibility and that 
of his witnesses. If Plaintiff in fact knew or should have known that his employees had 
engaged in such acts prior to working on Defendant's roof, it would have proven that he 
should have fired them or trained and supervised them better and since he did not, he was 
liable for their actions-even for their intentional torts. 
At trial, both Plaintiff and an expert witness testified about the workmanship and 
actions of his employees in installing the roof. If Defendant had discovered information 
that demonstrated him and his employees were not competent, honest or skillful, this 
information could have been used to rebut any of Plaintiff s assertions and to attack his 
credibility and his witnesses' credibility. Not only was such evidence directly relevant to 
the issue of negligence, URE Rule 406 specifically allows evidence of a habit or routine 
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practice to establish Plaintiff acted in conformity with the habit or routine practice. 
In denying its Motion to Compel on this request, the Trial Judge stated: 
. . . [Interrogatory No.2], as presently structured, is vague and overbroad. It is 
possible, however, that Defendant may be able to narrow and define this discovery 
request by using time limits and language that limits the information requested to 
that reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence under Utah Rules of 
Evidence 404(b). 
. . . [Request No. 12], appears to be substantively related to Interrogatory No.2.. . . 
this request is also vague. Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or entity 
that has ever had a "concern" or "problem" against it. Additionally, the scope of 
this discovery request appears to encompass situations not related to Defendant's 
claims for negligent employment or material breach of contract. 
Contrarily, especially in this case's circumstances, obtaining discovery should not 
become a guessing game about what a Trial Court judge, or opposing party, would deem 
as proper limiting language as to time and subject so that the request is not unduly 
burdensome and would only lead to relevant information. Moreover, the discovery 
deadline had past on January 30, 2003 (TR 30) and Plaintiff therefor refused to permit 
additional discovery. TR 325-326, 347-348; 447 If 7, 543 f 5. Consequently, Defendant 
could not redraft and resubmit its discovery requests without the Trial Court's permission 
which was refused. Even despite this, Interrogatories #2 and #3 and Request (for 
Documents) #12 were limited by time and subject because they sought only information 
known by Plaintiff and its agents about prior problems with workmanship and materials. 
If a Trial Court judge will not extend discovery in such situations to allow a 
litigant to redraft its requests, then at least the Trial Court should provide the limiting 
language it deems appropriate. This procedure is contemplated by the rules but is rarely 
used. URCP Rule 26 (c) states: 
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"Upon motion by a party . . . from whom discovery is sought.. . the court.. .may 
make any order which justice requires . . . including: . . . (c)(2) that the discovery 
may be had only on specified terms and conditions,... (c)(4) that certain matters 
not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain 
matters;..." 
Furthermore, even if discovery had been extended, without the Trial Court's 
guidance the parties may have engaged in another round of discovery requests, late 
answers and then Motions to Compel. In short, a litigant should not be left to guess what 
a particular Trial Judge would deem as acceptable, especially when the discovery 
deadlines have passed and the court is unwilling to extend the deadlines. 
The Trial Judge also ruled that the discovery requests were overbroad because, 
"Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or entity that has ever had a 'concern' or 
'problem' against it." Of course, the Plaintiff could not divulge "concerns" or 
"problems" he was unaware of, but could and should have divulged those he was aware 
of in his answers. It is axiomatic that a litigant can only respond to discovery with 
information it knows or is within its possession and control. 
In fact, "Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully, in writing 
under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the objecting party shall state the 
reasons for the objection and shall answer to the extent the interrogatory is not 
objectionable. URCP Rule 33 (b)(1). 
Further justifying her decision, the Trial Judge stated that: "the scope of this 
discovery request appears to encompass situations not related to Defendant's claims for 
negligent employment or material breach of contract." Contrarily, the test is not whether 
the discovery net may entrap or "encompass" information that is not relevant to a party's 
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claims or defenses, but whether it is reasonably calculated to entrap or "encompass" 
evidence that may be relevant The Defendant's discovery net was thrown to do just 
that, entrap or "encompass" evidence that may be relevant. Until these requests were 
answered, it was impossible to address whether or not the information that would have 
been obtained was relevant and admissible to parties' defenses and causes of action. 
Defendant's Interrogatories #4 and #5 requested whether Plaintiff or its agents had 
ever been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty and sought the 
details thereon. This information was directly relevant to whether or not Plaintiff 
negligently hired or retained any employee and to his and his employees' credibility. 
URE Rules 608 & 609 allow a witness' truthfulness to be attacked by any conviction for a 
crime, that is punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, or that involves 
dishonesty or false statements. URE Rule (609)(a)(b). 
In denying Defendant's request for this information, the Trial Judge stated: 
. . . [T]his discovery request is not limited to those who may be called as witnesses, 
but appears to apply to any employee of Plaintiff. See Utah R. Evid. 609. Upon 
identification of those persons who are likely to appear as witnesses at trial, 
Defendant might be able to provide a narrower construction of this discovery 
request. 
The Trial Judge's ruling is impracticable for several reasons. First, at the onset of 
litigation and discovery, it was not known by Defendant whom the Plaintiff would call as 
witnesses, nor even who the Defendant may have called as a result of its discovery 
investigation. As is the norm, the scheduling order in this case required Plaintiff to 
identify his witnesses after discovery had closed within 14 days prior to trial. (TR 30, 
31). Since Defendant could not engage in discovery after discovery had closed, it could 
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not limit its discovery request to only "witnesses." However, as URCP Rule 26 requires, 
it could draft its request in a manner reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence. It 
did so by limiting its request to "Plaintiff or its agents." 
Second, practically speaking it would have been very simple for the Plaintiff to 
have indicated if he, his business as an entity or his employees had ever been convicted of 
a felony or a crime of dishonesty. Hence the limitation to just the Plaintiff and his 
employees was sufficiently detailed and restricted as to not be unduly vague, overbroad or 
burdensome. Then, in the event any were called as a witness (as Plaintiff was), the 
information would have already been obtained and verified. 
Third, this information was relevant to Defendant's claim of negligent employment 
regardless of whether or not the Plaintiff or his employees were "witnesses." If Plaintiff 
knew, for instance that an employee had been convicted of a felony for lewdness, the jury 
may have concluded that he should have supervised or terminated the employee before he 
exposed himself to Defendant's unit owners. 
Fourth, had discovery been extended to allow Defendant to locate and interview or 
depose Plaintiffs employees, knowing that these employees had a criminal conviction 
would have allowed defendant to evaluate the employee's credibility which is relevant to 
Defendant in calling such a person as a witness. 
Defendant's Request (for Documents) #6 asked Plaintiff to produce copies of the 
"personnel files, wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either employees or 
independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to 
Defendant." Such evidence would have allowed Defendant to explore many factual 
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issues directly relevant to the case. 
First, personnel records contain contact location information on the particular 
employee, often including alternative addresses of friends, family and prior employers so 
that if the employee had moved they could be located through these other sources. Such 
information also allows a litigant to verify if the opposing party has been honest and 
thorough in providing last know addresses and phone numbers. In this case, although 
Plaintiff provided the last known addresses and phone numbers of his employees, 
Defendant was only able to locate one of them and could not verify the thoroughness nor 
truthfulness of Plaintiff s information which appeared to be highly suspect. 
Second, personnel files, wage statements and contracts could have established 
when and how long each employee or agent actually spent working on the Defendant's 
roofing project to rebut or validate allegations of adequate staffing and actual work 
performed or to rebut the witnesses' testimony about their presence or lack of presence on 
the job site. This information may have also reflected upon the credibility of any 
witnesses. For instance if any employee witness, including the Plaintiff, claimed to have 
had knowledge that work on a certain day was done properly, yet his time card or other 
records indicated he wasn't there, this would be relevant. Also, any wages paid were 
relevant to Plaintiffs Unjust Enrichment Claim to show Plaintiffs damages or lack 
thereof. 
Third, personnel records may have had information about the employees skill 
levels, qualifications, and other background information such as the Plaintiffs business 
practices, habits and routines and whether or not any employee was fired, disciplined, or 
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suspended for poor workmanship or committing torts on the job site. This information 
was relevant to Defendant's allegation of negligent employment. Moreover, all of 
Plaintiffs employees or independent contractors who supplied services or materials to 
Defendant were potential witnesses and all information involving their backgrounds may 
have been relevant. Such information is routinely requested and should have been 
provided in discovery. In re Hawaii Corp., 88 FRD 518, 525 (D. Haw 1998). 
Fourth, contracts and wage statements from those who supplied materials to the 
project would have allowed Defendant to verify the quality and quantity of the supplies 
actually integrated into the roofing project. Such information was reasonably calculated 
to lead to relevant evidence about whether the proper materials were integrated into the 
roof and what where the costs and quality of the roofing material. This information was 
directly relevant to the Plaintiffs claim of Unjust Enrichment and to Defendant's causes 
of action for breach of contract. For instance, had Plaintiff been unable to produce proper 
invoices for the materials integrated into the roofing project this would have supported 
Defendant's claim for breach of contract. 
In denying its Motion to Compel on this request, the Trial Judge stated: 
. . . Defendant asserts, without support, that this information is necessary for it to 
maintain its counterclaims. While some of these documents arguably may be 
relevant, as it is currently drafted, the request is over broad. 
Contrarily, this request was limited to all persons that were either employees or 
independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to 
Defendant. Hence, it was limited to only those persons working on or supplying 
materials integrated into Defendant's roof. This language limited the request to the 
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period that the contract was performed. Moreover, if "some of these documents arguably 
may be relevant," why wasn't the Plaintiff simply ordered to provide any such documents 
with whatever restrictions the Trial Court may have imposed to cure the requests 
"overbroadness?" This request was therefore not overbroad. 
Plaintiff may claim that since, pursuant to request for documents #5, he provided 
some invoices during trial alleged to pertain to Defendant's roof that this negates this 
Defendant's arguments hereon. However, at trial there was no way for Defendant to 
verify that the invoices actually pertained to materials integrated into Defendant's roof 
The invoices that were provided could have been purchases made for other roofing 
projects. Had Defendant been permitted to complete discovery, it could have explored 
whether or not the invoices pertained to other roofing projects. Consequently, it was error 
for the Trial Court's to refuse to compel discovery. 
Defendant further contends that the Trial Court's abused its discretion by refusing 
to extend discovery. In this case after the initial position pleadings and scheduling order 
were provided to the court, on July 9, 2002 Plaintiff sent his discovery request to 
Defendant. TR 84. On August 19, 2002, Defendant then filed an informal request that 
the Trial Judge recuse herself. TR 58-68. On August 6, 2002, Defendant timely provided 
an extensive response to Plaintiffs discovery request. TR 377-421, 494-501. 
On Aug. 28, 2002 Defendant provided to Plaintiff its discovery request. TR 72-73. 
On Dec. 16, 2002 Defendant's request to recuse Judge Lindberg was sent for a decision 
and an Order thereon was signed Jan. 1, 2003. TR 77-78, 79-81. Then on Jan. 24, 2003, 
four and a half months late, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's discovery request. TR 84. 
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On Feb. 5, 2003 Defendant filed its Motion to Compel. TR 85-107. 
On March, 31, 2003, after the discovery cut off deadline the Trial Court ruled upon 
the Motion to Compel. TR 160-165. Plaintiff thereafter refused to engage in more 
discovery. TR 447 ^ 7, 543 ^ 5. On May 7, 2003 due to Judge Lindberg's continued 
conduct, the Defendant again sought to formally recuse Judge Lindberg. On April 25, 
2003 and then on May 2, 2003, Defendant moved to extend the discovery deadlines. TR 
166-167, 290-291. On July 3, 2003, Judge Lindberg recused herself from the case. 
The case was then assigned to Judge Hansen who, in a telephone conference 
allowed Plaintiffs to file an untimely response to Defendant's Motions for an Extension 
of Discovery and set another telephone conference to address the Motions. One day prior 
to the second telephone conference, in a written Minute Entry, the Trial Judge denied the 
Motions stating: 
. . . The court notes that the Defendant requests a hearing on this request for 
Extension. However, since the Request... is not dispositive motion and since the 
parties' written submissions adequately represent their respective legal positions,. 
. . the Court rules as stated herein. . . 
The Defendant seeks to extend the January 30, 2002, (sic-2003) discovery 
deadline on the basis that discovery in this matter has been delayed by settlement 
negotiations, the filing of recusal requests and the filing of Motion to Compel. Of 
these, only the pendency of a motion to compel could have potentially hindered 
discovery from progressing. However, while the Motion to Compel was decided 
on March 31, 2003, the Defendant (for unknown reasons) has taken no further 
steps to complete its discovery in the months following. Furthermore, as the 
Plaintiff accurately describes in his opposition, this case has already been unduly 
delayed and the Defendant had not articulated an adequate basis to delay it further. 
Accordingly, having considered the Defendant's Request, the Court denies the 
same. TR 325-326, 347-348. 
The Trial Court's denial is an abuse of discretion because it rewarded the 
Plaintiffs failure to timely respond to discovery, ignored the obvious bar against 
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Defendant to engage in further discovery, and it penalized the Defendant for having 
sought and been successful in recusing a fellow District Court Judge and for engaging in 
settlement discussions. 
First Plaintiff and not Defendant, waited more than four months to respond to 
discovery. In its opposition, Plaintiff argued that Defendant was unduly dilatory. 
However, even a cursory review of the case history set forth above, demonstrates a 
consistent effort to advance the case. 
Second, Defendant could not engage in further discovery in the months following 
the ruling on the Motion to Compel because the discovery deadline had passed and 
Plaintiff refused to engage in further discovery. Also, in her ruling on the Motion to 
Compel, the Trial Judge invited Defendant to redraft its requests. Based thereon, what 
was Defendant to do to "[take] further steps to complete its discovery in the months 
following [March 31, 2003]," hold a gun to Plaintiffs head? No, the only thing it could 
do is what it did, file its Motions to Extend in April and then again in May 2003. 
Therefore how can Judge Hanson state that there were some "unknown reasons" why 
Defendant could complete discovery. He himself stated in his ruling that on "January 30, 
2002 (sic-2003)" the "discovery deadline" had expired. 
Third, Defendant's successful efforts to recuse Judge Lindberg had indeed delayed 
the case. Anecdotally, Defendant's counsel has been warned that even legitimate 
concerns raised against a sitting judge could prejudice him with others Judges. 
Nevertheless, with all due respect, Defendant's counsel believed that Judge Lindberg 
could and would not act impartially and he sought her recusal because he did not want her 
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making further decision. Now it appears that Plaintiff and Judge Hansen would opine 
that causing this delay in this case to recuse a fellow Judge should in fact be sanctioned as 
"undue delay." 
Lastly, the Plaintiff and the Trial Judge would penalize as "undue delay" by 
Defendant the two months spent in settlement negotiations even though over lapping the 
same time Plaintiff delayed his discovery responses by more than four months. Plaintiff 
will further argue that Defendant did nothing during settlement negotiations. This is a 
curious argument. Plaintiffs counsel billed for preparing settlement documents in 
November 2003. (TR 622). Nevertheless, it is reasonable that both parties would not 
want to expend more attorney's fees while there was a possibility of a settlement. Hence, 
while Defendant's counsel waited to hear back from the Defendant condominium 
association on the settlement negotiations, Defendant's counsel tried to resolve the 
discovery dispute (TR 699) and in December 2003, when settlement did not occur, he 
requested that Plaintiff respond to its discovery. TR 695. 
Of further note, although the Trial Judge correctly noted that the administrative 
rules do not require oral argument on discovery matters, after allowing Plaintiff the right 
to file an untimely response to Defendant's Motions to Extend, he set a telephone 
conference to orally address the Motions. Despite this, one day before the telephone 
conference, he made his ruling. Perhaps had he allowed the promised argument, defense 
counsel could have reminded him that the discovery deadline had passed and thereafter 
Plaintiff would not allow further discovery. TR 543-544. Therefore it was not "for 
unknown reasons" Defendant had "taken no further steps to complete its discovery in the 
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months following," the Trial Court's ruling on March 31, 2003; the case had not been 
"unduly delayed;" and the right to complete discovery is "an adequate basis to delay" a 
case. Accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to compel discovery 
and then in failing to allow Defendant to complete discovery. 
Since there has been this error, it is Plaintiffs burden to prove that it was harmless. 
In, Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) [overturned on 
certiorari on other grounds], the Court of Appeals stated: 
However, the usual harmless-error analysis is inapposite where the Trial Court has 
erroneously denied a discovery request. In such situations, this court is required to 
presume prejudice unless it is shown that the denial was harmless. Prejudice is 
presumed because to require the requesting party to show that the error was 
harmful would place the requesting party in the untenable position of having to 
demonstrate that the contents of inaccessible information would have affected the 
outcome of the case. Because the requesting party does not have the information, 
he or she will never be able to demonstrate that the Trial Court's erroneous denial 
of a discovery request was anything but harmless. The burden of demonstrating 
that the erroneous denial of a discovery request was not prejudicial must therefore 
rest with the party resisting discovery. (Citations omitted) 
II. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ITS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES? 
Plaintiffs contract with Defendant contained a provision stating, "If collection is 
made by lawsuit or otherwise, customer agrees to pay interest accrued until paid, 
customer also agrees to pay all collection costs, including attorney's fees." Pursuant to 
UCA § 78-27-5, this contractual provision is made reciprocal. Consequently, since both 
parties prevailed in this action, the Trial Court had to determine which party prevailed and 
then to award it reasonable attorney's fees. Defendant asserts that the Trial Court abused 
its discretion in its analysis and award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiff as the prevailing 
party. 
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Defendant further asserts, even if attorney's fees were properly awarded to the 
Plaintiff as the prevailing party, the fees awarded were excessive. Defendant pursued and 
prevailed on all of its tort claims. These claims do not allow an award of attorney's fees. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs request for fees did not allocate attorney's fees expended in 
defending against these claims. 
A. Prevailing Party 
In this matter, the Plaintiff pursued two causes of action, the first for Breach 
Contract, and the second for Unjust Enrichment. The Plaintiff sought a judgment for 
$25,906 plus a 10% penalty and an 18% interest charge. The Defendant counterclaimed 
for Material Breach of Contract, Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of 
Privacy, Trespass and Conversion. As a result of a general verdict form, the jury 
rendered a judgment in Defendant's favor on its causes of action for $4,200 and for the 
Plaintiff for more than $31,000. So who prevailed? 
The prevailing party is not determined solely by size of the monetary award but by 
many other factors. In David C. v. Leavitt, 900 F. Supp. 1547 (Ut. Fed. Dist. Ct. 1995), 
the Utah Federal District Court, cited as persuasive authority, stated: 
Plaintiffs typically are considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees purposes f,fif 
they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the 
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The 
"touchstone" to, and precondition of, prevailing party status is the "'material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.'" 
In this case, it is Defendant that obtained the material alteration in the legal 
relationship of the parties. This is so because, in essence, the jury determined that 
Plaintiff Mr. Stout was not due all the money he requested under his contract when he 
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provided his invoice to Defendant because, as concluded by the jury, Defendant was 
entitled to an offset against Plaintiffs invoice of $4,200. 
In, R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court in 
determining who was the prevailing party stated: 
. . .[Determining the prevailing party for purposes of awarding fees can oftentimes 
be quite simple. Where a Plaintiff sues for money damages, and Plaintiff wins, 
Plaintiff is the prevailing party; if Defendant successfully defends and avoids 
adverse judgment, Defendant has prevailed. This simple analysis cannot always be 
employed, however. . . . [There is] . . . difficulty in determining which party 
prevails in complicated cases involving multiple claims and parties, mentioned that 
in some circumstances both parties may be considered to have prevailed, and 
[there is therefore] the "need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in 
particular cases who actually is the 'prevailing party.'ff Which party is the 
prevailing party is an appropriate question for the Trial Court. This question 
depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is 
appropriate to leave this determination to the sound discretion of the Trial Court. 
We therefore review the Trial Court's determination as to who was the prevailing 
party under an abuse of discretion standard. Appropriate considerations for the 
Trial Court would include, but are not limited to, (1) contractual language, (2) 
the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the 
parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and their 
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the 
dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various 
claims. Based on these and other relevant factors, the Trial Court is in a better 
position than we are as an appellate court to decide which party is the prevailing 
party. . . . However, the standard articulated above will permit a case-by-case 
evaluation by the Trial Court, and flexibility to handle circumstances where both, 
or neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed. 
(1) Contractual Language. 
Plaintiff can request attorney's fees for his Breach of Contract Claim and not for 
his Unjust Enrichment claim. Plaintiffs contract stated that, "If collection is made by 
lawsuit or otherwise, customer agrees to pay interest accrued . . . [and] all collection 
costs, including attorney's fees." At the time Plaintiff presented his invoice for payment, 
Defendant disputed the amount because of the causes of action asserted in this lawsuit. 
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The Jury agreed with Defendant and granted it a $4,200 offset against the invoice. The 
contract only allows an attorney's fee award to Plaintiff for expenses in collections not for 
an initial dispute over the contract invoice that is shown to be incorrect by the Defendant. 
The attorney fee provision was only operable after this case's judgment was rendered. 
(2) The Number of Claims, Counterclaims, Cross-claims, Etc., Brought by the 
Parties. 
Although Plaintiff was awarded $31,000 under the contract, Defendant prevailed 
on its claims for Breach of Contract, Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion 
of Privacy, Trespass and Conversion. It can only be argued the Defendant failed to 
prevail on its claim for Material Breach of Contract, However, the causes of action for 
Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, Trespass and Conversion 
do not allow a party an award for attorney's fees in defending them or prosecuting 
them and no attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiff for its unsuccessful 
defense of these claims. 
(3) The Importance of the Claims Relative to Each Other and Their 
Significance in the Context of the Lawsuit Considered as a Whole. 
Prosecuting and defending breach of contract claims are not complex-in this case 
Plaintiff merely had to introduce the contract, state that the work had been preformed and 
indicate what he was still owed thereunder. Defendant's torts and breach of contract 
claims were much more complicated. Moreover, Plaintiff admitted at trial that his 
misfeasance had damaged the Defendant's air-conditioning units. These units did not 
have a market value. This created a difficult evidentiary burden for the Defendant. 
Defendant also had a difficult evidentiary burden proving the general damages associated 
29 
with Mr. Stout's tortious behavior. Hence, the damages awarded should not be the 
controlling factor to determine the prevailing party. What should be the measure of 
success it that Defendant advanced important and significant issues that perhaps by their 
moral superiority are a better measure of success? Moreover, the social importance of the 
Defendant's counterclaims, when they are considered "relative to each other and their 
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole," would indicate that 
Defendant was the prevailing party in this action. 
(4) The Dollar Amounts Attached to and Awarded in Connection with the 
Various Claims. 
Plaintiff did receive a larger award than Defendant and therefore this factor alone 
is in his favor. In determining who was the prevailing party, the Trial Judge stated: 
. . . Under the case law recited in the Defendant's brief, it is undoubtable 
that the Plaintiff prevailed on the significant issues in this litigation and that the 
Defendant's success (. . . in terms of monetary recovery and legal issues presented) 
was nominal... TR 772. 
While it is true that "in terms of monetary recovery," Plaintiff appears to prevail, it 
is not true that "Defendant's success (both in terms of.. . legal issues presented) was 
nominal." What causes of action or "legal issues presented" did the Defendant not 
prevail on? The Trial Court cannot say and in fact engaged in no analysis to indicate 
Defendant failed to prevail on all of them or to demonstrate that any other factors other 
than the monetary were applied in making its decision. Hence, a more sound decision 
would be that it is Defendant who altered the legal position of the parties in this lawsuit 
and is therefore the prevailing party. In the alternative, no fees and costs should be 
awarded either side, or the amount requested by the Plaintiff for attorneys' fees should be 
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reduced substantially. 
In Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah 1990) the 
Supreme Court stated: 
"An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence in the record which 
supports the award. However, a Trial Court is not compelled to accept the 
self-serving testimony of a party requesting attorney fees even if there is no 
opposing testimony/1 A court, when determining what is a reasonable fee, may 
reduce the amount requested, after considering factors such as: the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, . . . the amount 
involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved. (Citations omitted) 
Also, as persuasive authority, Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F, Supp. 1544 (Utah 
1993), the Utah Federal District court stated: 
Before submitting a fee application to the court, the prevailing party must "make a 
good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, 
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice 
ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission." 
Another category of time in which reductions are appropriate is unnecessary 
duplicative time.. ."If the same task is performed by more than one lawyer, 
multiple compensation should be denied." The problem of duplication of hours 
is frequently encountered in cases of multiple representation because too many 
attorneys (all billing their time) are present at meetings, hearings, and depositions: 
"The more lawyers representing a side of the litigation, the greater the 
likelihood will be for duplication of services." . . . MIt is often important to 
analyze and exclude duplication of time spent on aspects of a case where 
several lawyers, paraprofessionals and/or clerks are working simultaneously." 
(Citations omitted) 
In Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co., 56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he Trial Court had broad discretion in deciding what constitutes reasonable 
attorney fees, and we will not reverse that determination absent an abuse of 
discretion. 
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First, in exercising its discretion in awarding attorney fees, a Trial Court considers 
all the evidence and arguments presented regarding the award and in its discretion 
determines a reasonable fee. . . [Accepting one party's argument over the other is 
not an abuse of discretion in the absence of substantial proof that the Trial Court 
abused its discretion. . . [A] Trial Court is not required to adopt the prevailing 
party's assertion of what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee. 
Second,... the Trial Court can award Prince [in this case a party] attorney fees 
only for those issues on which he was the prevailing party. Indeed, we have 
explained that a party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its 
underlying claims. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees expended 
for "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, 
(2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney 
fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no 
entitlement to attorney fees." 
. . . In addition, "while a Trial Court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for 
failure to allocate, it may not award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they 
have not been allocated as to separate claims and/or parties." In the instant case, 
Prince [in this case, Pioneer] was not the prevailing party with respect to whether 
the statute required that Bear River pay only necessary claims [was not the 
prevailing party with respect to Defendant's counterclaims].. . (Citations omitted.) 
Based upon these principles, Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees should be 
reduced for the following reasons. First, since Defendant proved its counterclaims, and 
since Plaintiff expended considerable time unsuccessfully preparing for and defending 
against the Defendant's claims, his requested fees should have been allocated and should 
not have been awarded by the Trial Court. 
Second, his requested attorney's fees, as set forth in the statement of facts, 
included entries for frivolous, withdrawn, and unsuccessful-non-meritorious motions, and 
payment for expenses that were duplicated because of several attorneys being involved in 
the same matter. Also, Plaintiffs attorneys took an unnecessarily adversarial position in 
this case which increased costs. 
In determining whether all Plaintiffs attorney's fees billed should be taxed to 
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Defendant, the Trial Judge stated: 
. . . Having reviewed these specific entries, the Court concludes that the 
Defendant's objections are without merit and that a reduction in the fees is 
unwarranted. In fact, a number of the Defendant's objections are based on the 
invalid argument that simply because a particular motion or legal endeavor 
pursued by the Plaintiff was eventually unsuccessful, there should be no recovery 
for the time attributable thereto. However, it is the overall outcome that is 
determinative of prevailing party status and attorney fee recovery and not the 
success of each individual motion or legal effort. TR 772-773. 
The ruling oversimplifies Defendant's arguments and the law thereon. Plaintiff 
had a duty, "Before submitting a fee application to the court. . make a good-faith effort 
to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 
unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such 
hours from his fee submission." Jane L., supra. In this case, a private lawyer would not 
have billed for excessive, frivolous and unwarranted and unduly adversarial actions. 
Moreover, a trial court "may reduce the amount requested, after considering factors such 
as : . . .the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the 
number of hours spent." Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs bills for Motions that were 
not filed, were frivolous and were unsuccessful should not be taxed because they were 
"unnecessary," demonstrated inefficiency, and the number of hours spent on them were 
not reasonable. 
Plaintiff unnecessarily double billed: "If the same task is performed by more 
than one lawyer, multiple compensation should be denied." Jane L.} supra. Double 
billing and attorney consultation between attorneys were found in Plaintiffs bill in entries 
3-9, 14, 18, 27, and 33. Plaintiffs attorneys double billed for time spent drafting a Rule 
11 letter, at entries 53-54, to Defendant's counsel threatening him with sanctions. No 
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such sanctions were ever imposed and the allegations were frivolous. 
Plaintiff unnecessarily overcharged: Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment 
are not complex. To research and draft the complaint, Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total 
of 7.2 hours at entries 4-7. To research and draft an answer and reply to Defendant's 
counterclaim, Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total of 8.6 hours at entries 8-12. This time is 
excessive. 
Plaintiff excessively and unnecessarily billed for frivolous time on issues not even 
pursued or allowed by the rules of civil procedure: The rules do not require a responsive 
motion to a Motion to Recuse. Nevertheless, Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged 
Defendant's motion to recuse Judge Lindberg-billing at total of 12.8 hours at entries 25-
29-and admitting that it filed its response simply because he felt that as an adversary, he 
had to oppose Defendant's Motion to Recuse. TR 669 f 7. Plaintiffs attorneys billed 
time for a Motion to Dismiss that was never filed by Plaintiff and prepared 
documentation for settlement of the case. No such documents were ever discussed nor 
agreed upon by the parties. These are at entries 8, 35. Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time 
in its unsuccessful and frivolous challenge to strike Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Discovery at entries 43-44, 48. This is so because Plaintiffs attorney asserted that 
Defendant had not consulted with him prior to filing its Motion to Compel. Plaintiffs 
attorney's own billing entries demonstrate that such correspondence in fact occurred. 
After presenting proof thereof, Judge Lindberg found this claim to be unfounded, without 
merit and denied the Motion to Strike. 
Plaintiffs attorney billed for time unnecessary spent: Judge Lindberg's clerk 
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represented to Defendant that a jury fee had not been paid. Therefore Defendant filed a 
Rule 39 (b) request for a jury. Rather than simply inform Defendant that it had made 
payment, Plaintiffs counsel prepared and billed for an objection to the request at entry 
51. 
Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time for preparing, on the eve of trial, several 
motions, including a Motion to Strike and Motion for Order to Preclude New Evidence at 
entries 61, 64-65. These Motions were frivolous and were withdrawn by Plaintiff after 
Defendant had spent considerable time responding to them and filing counter motions 
demonstrating their complete lack of foundation. 
All of these billings should have been scrutinized by the Trial Court. The Trial 
Court's ruling thereon demonstrates that he in fact "accept[ed] the self-serving 
testimony of a party requesting attorney fees . . . " in his award. No effort was made to 
consider "the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, [and] the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case . . . " 
Moreover, since the Defendant pursued and prevailed on its tort claims for which 
no attorney's fees could be awarded, "the Trial Court [could award Plaintiff] attorney 
fees only for those issues on which he was the prevailing party. Indeed, [Plaintiff in] 
seeking fees [should have allocated its fee] . . . [for] the time and fees expended for (1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees [and], . . . (3) 
claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Since Plaintiff did not, the 
Trial Court should have either denied "fees altogether for failure to allocate," or at least 
not awarded "wholesale all attorney fees requested [because] they [had] not been 
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allocated.55 
Lastly, the Trial Court should have taken into consideration the "inefficient" and 
improper actions by Plaintiff that increased the fees and the uncertainty of the litigation. 
As stated above, Plaintiff finally conceded at trial that he had damaged Defendant's air 
cooling units. Also, Plaintiff provided a few invoices at trial for materials allegedly 
integrated into the roof. They should have been provided a year sooner with his discovery 
responses. These actions were in bad faith and in violation with the Civil Rules of 
Procedure. Timely admissions and responses to discovery would have averted the need of 
both parties to address these issues during the litigation thus avoided unnecessary 
expenses, or even hastening a settlement of that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully requested that the Trial Court be found to have 
abused its discretion in not compelling discovery, not extending the discovery deadlines 
and then in awarding all attorney's fees billed by Plaintiff as the prevailing party. 
Dated: £kc- 7 7/ ZOO H• 
Arrow Legal Solutions 
Attorney for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
JOHN F. STOUT d.b.a. PIONEER 
ROOFING CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY ON MOTION TO 
COMPEL, MOTION TO STRIKE 
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
Judge Denise P. Lindlx i ^  
Case no. 020404177 
T[l Three motions are before the Court: (1) Defendant's Motion to Compel and Request for 
Attorney's Fees, filed February 5,2003; (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to 
Compel and Request for Attorney's Fees, filed February 20,2003; and (3) Plaintiffs Motion for 
Protective Order. Based upon the Court's review of the parties' memoranda and the law, the 
Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Compel, DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, but 
GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
T[2 These motions arise out ot Plaintiffs action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, 
originally filed April 19, 2002. In its Complaint Plaintiff alleged that it contracted with 
Defendant to provide roofing services and materials to be used in improving Defendant's 
property, and that Defendant failed to pay for these services. 
\S Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaim on May 9, 2002. First, Defendant alleged 
that Plaintiff materially breached the contract by failing to perform the work competently and by 
causing damage to Defendant's premises. Second, Defendant claims that "Plaintiff failed to 
properly hire, train, supervise and discipline its employees." Plaintiff replied to Defendant's 
Counterclaim on May 15,2002. 
K4 Following an attorneys' planning meeting, Defendant submitted to Plaintiff its First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in August 2002. On September 13, 
1 
2002, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant setting forth objections to the discovery requests. These 
objections were also set forth in Plaintiffs responses to Defendant's discovery requests. 
Although the parties explored settlement options between September and December 2002, the 
parties could not come to agreement. 
1f5 Thereafter, on February 5, 2003 Defendant filed this Motion to Compel and for Attorneys 
Fees. Plaintiff responded by moving to Strike Defendant's motion on the ground that Defendant 
had not included a Rule 37(2)(A) certification that it had made a prior good faith attempt to 
secure the requested disclosures from Plaintiff. Simultaneously, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Protective Order, arguing that the Defendant's discovery requests are vague, overbroad, or 
unduly burdensome. Defendant filed a "Verified Reply" and requested oral argument on 
February 28, 2003. 
ANALYSIS 
%6 The Rules of Judicial Administration provide, 
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any claim 
in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the 
principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a 
written request for a hearing. 
Rule 4-501(3)(R) (emphasis added). 
X Defendant did not comply with the clear requirements of Rule 4-501. Defendant did not 
include a request for oral argument in its Motion to Compel, "the principal memorandum in 
support of" its motion. Rather, Defendant waited until filing its Reply to request oral argument. 
Moreover, the rules presume that motions will be addressed without hearing unless, as noted 
above, the parties timely file their request for oral argument and the pending motion is one which 
could be dispositive of one or more of the claims on the merits with prejudice. Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 4-501(3)(B). Neither of those prerequisites has been met in this case. Thus, the Court 
DENIES Defendant's request and makes its determinations on the pending motions based solely 
on the documents submitted by the parties. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
1[8 In its Motion to Strike Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to include certification 
required Rule 37(2)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While it is true that Defendant 
failed to include such a certification in its original motion, Defendant has since cured this 
problem by providing the certification in its Reply. Because this is the sole ground raised by 
Plaintiff in support of its motion, this motion has been rendered moot by subsequent action by 
Defendant. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion. 
2 
iL 
Defendant's Motion to Compel * 
V. Defendant argues that its discovery requests are appropriate because they may lead to 
admissible evidence regarding the credibility, skill, and knowledge of Plaintiff s employees, 
which Defendant alleges is at issue in this case. Defendant has alleged that Plaintiff "provided 
shoddy workmanship, substandard materials and actually caused damage to the Creekside 
premises and its equipment," as well as that Plaintiffs employees "exposed themselves to 
Creekside habitants, urinated in full view of Creekside residents, and soiled the premises." For 
the reasons given below, the Court DENIES each of Defendant's discovery requests because they 
are vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. 
Tl'10 In Intenof alorv No. 2, Defendant asks Plaintili to 
[p]rovide the last know names and numbers of any business entities, governmental 
agencies, persons who have ever had any complaints, concerns, lawsuits, disputes, 
problems, issues regarding any of the supplies, workmanship, or services provided 
by Plaintiff or its agent to any persons or businesses or other legal matters. 
%l 1 Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, claiming it is 
. . . vague, ambiguous, overbroad [sic], unduly burdensome, oppressive, and 
beyond the scope of discovery permitted by Rule because it requests information 
that is not relevant to the subject matter of the pending litigation and is not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence at trial. 
f 12 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this interrogatory, as presently structured, is vague 
and overbroad. It is possible, however, that Defendant may be able to narrow and define this 
discovery request by using time limits and language that limits the information requested to that 
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b). 
T| 13 In Interrogatory IN o * Defendant requests 
. . . the party names, the name of the court and docket numbers of lawsuits or 
administrative actions filed against Plaintiff or its agents because of any of its 
business practice or because of its services, materials or workmanship. 
f 14 The Court again agrees with Plaintiff that this interrogatory is vague and overbroad. 
Arguably, this particular request could be narrowed by providing reasonable time limits to the 
request and limiting the request to causes of action that relate to the claims Defendant has made 
against Plaintiff. 
1]15 Defendant's Interrogatories Nos 4 and 5 relate to the same issues In Interrogator y No 4, 
3 
Defendant seeks the following information: "Has Plaintiff or its agents ever been convicted of 
any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty?" Interrogatory No. 5 seeks specific 
information in the event that Interrogatory No. 4 is answered in the affirmative. 
f 16 In support of its request, Defendant argues that information regarding a witness's honesty 
is always relevant for establishing credibility. Nevertheless, this discovery request is not limited 
to those who may be called as witnesses, but appears to apply to any employee of Plaintiff. See 
Utah R. Evid. 609. Upon identification of those persons who are likely to appear as witnesses at 
trial, Defendant might be able to provide a narrower construction of this discovery request. 
f 17 Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 7 are also related. Interrogatory No. 6 asks, "Do you claim that 
Defendant or its agents made any representations that were incorrect?" If Plaintiff answers this 
interrogatory in the affirmative, Interrogatory No. 7 requests specific information regarding any 
such misrepresentations. These discovery requests are also vague, overbroad, and ambiguous. 
Plaintiff has no way of knowing what "any representations" are. Furthermore, particular 
representations or misrepresentations do not appear to be an issue in this case. 
Tfl8 The Court next turns to Defendant's requests for documents. Defendant asserts that 
Plaintiff failed to fulfill Requests Nos. 6, 7, and 12. Plaintiff has made a general objection to 
these requests, alleging that they "are over broad [sic], vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome, 
and the information is protected by the attorney-client and work-produce privileges." 
1(19 In Request No. 6, Defendant asks Plaintiff to "produce a copy of each of the personnel 
files, wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either employees or independent 
contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to Defendant." Defendant asserts, 
without support, that this information is necessary for it to maintain its counterclaims. While 
some of these documents arguably may be relevant, as it is currently drafted, the request is 
overbroad. 
K20 Defendant's Request No. 12 asks Plaintiff to 
. . . produce a copy of each and every document, recording, photograph, or other 
item evidencing any complaints, concerns, lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues 
regarding any of the supplies, workmanship, or services provided by Plaintiff or 
its agents to any persons or businesses or other legal entities. 
f 21 This request appears to be substantively related to Interrogatory No. 2. As the Court has 
already concluded with respect to the prior request, see supra ffif 10-12, this request is also 
vague. Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or entity that has ever had a "concern" or 
"problem" against it. Additionally, the scope of this discovery request appears to encompass 
situations not related to Defendant's claims for negligent employment or material breach of 
contract. 
4 
Plaintiffs Motion tor Protective Order 
^22 For the same reasons that the Court has DENIED Defendant's Motions to Compel, the 
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order. 
ORDER 
II21 The Court DENffiS^laintiff s Motion to Strike, DENIES Defendant's Motion to 
Compel, and GRANTS BetSnoatrt^viotion for Protective Order. Because Defendant has not 
prevailed in its motion, the Court also DENIES its request for attorney's fees. 
So Ordered this 31st day of March, 2003 B\ 11K ( \>uit 
/ ^ o F " $ 
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EXHIBIT B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AtTO FOR SALT \,hKK BOUNTY, STATU OF UTAH 
JOHN F. STOUT, doing business 
as PIONEER ROOFING CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
M1N1JTK ENTRY 
CASE NO. 030917317 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 1 6 2003 
Deputy Clerk 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
defendant seeking a ruling on its Request fur Extensa 01 1 of 
Discovery. The Court notes that the defendant requests a hearing 
on this Request for Extension However, since the Request for 
Extension is not a dispositive motion and since the parties1 
written submissions adequately represent their respective legal 
positions, the Court declines to schedule this matter for hearing. 
Therefore, having ireviewed the defendants1 Request and the 
plaintiff!s opposition thereto, the Court rules as stated herein. 
The defendant seeks to extend the January 30, 2002, discovery 
deadline on the basis that discovery in this matter has been 
delayed by settlement negotiations, the filing of recusal requests 
and the filing of a Motion to Compel. Of these, only the pendency 
of a motion to compel could have potentially hindered discovery 
STOUT V. CREEKSIDE 
EAST CONDO ASSOC. PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
from progressing. However, while the Motion to Compel was decided 
on March 31, 2003, the defendant (for unknown reasons) has taken no 
further steeps to complete its discovery in the months following. 
Furthermore, as the plaintiff accurately describes in his 
opposition, this case has already been unduly delayed and the 
defendant has not articulated an adequate basis to delay it 
further. Accordingly, having considered the defendants Request, 
the Court denies the same. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the 
Court, denying the defendants Request for Extension. 
STOUT V. CREEKSIDE 
EAST CONDO ASSOC. PAGE 3 Ml NUT I ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify thai 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this H> day of October, 
2003: 
Gregory P. Hawkins 
Rick L. Sorensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
45 West 10000 South, Suite 307 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Loren M. Lambert 
Attorney for Defendant 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
^i^^mj 
EXHIBIT C 
JLEB E1STAICT COURT 
IM A (n F n Third Judic!el District 
APR - 5 200^ 
By Sy 
SALT LAKE CQIJK 
Deputy Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN F. STOUT, doing business 
as PIONEER ROOFING CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 030917317 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DATE 
The Court has before it a Notice to Submit for decision filed 
by the plaintiff seeking a ruling on its counsel's Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees, filed on January 12, 2004. The defendant filed a 
Request for Extension of Time to Respond to this Affidavit on 
January 22, 2004, which the plaintiff opposed. Then, without leave 
of Court, the defendant filed an untimely Response to the 
plaintiff's Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and a Counter Request for 
Attorney's Fees. These were accompanied by defense counsel's 
Affidavit. Despite the untimeliness of the defendant's Response 
and Counter Request, the Court determines that in the interest of 
justice, both should be considered. However, the Court declines 
the defendant's request for oral argument. The issue of attorney's 
fees is not dispositive and, since both sides' written submissions 
adequately set forth their respective legal positions, oral 
Minute Entry and Order @J 
STOUT V. CREEKSIDE 
EAST CONDO ASSOC. PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
argument is neither necessary nor helpful. Therefore, having 
reviewed the Affidavit of Attorney!s Fees filed by plaintiff's 
counsel, the defendant's Response and Counter Request, the 
Affidavit of defense counsel and the plaintiff's Reply thereto, the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
Plaintiff's counsel, Rick L. Sorenson, has submitted his 
Affidavit detailing the attorney's fees and costs that the 
plaintiff incurred, totaling $20,329.00. In its Response, the 
defendant raises a number of alternative arguments for reducing 
these fees, eliminating them altogether or for awarding the 
defendant its attorney's fees and costs. With respect to the 
latter two arguments, the defendant essentially contends that the 
jury's verdict was "factually and legally invalid" and that it 
should be considered the prevailing party. 
The Court has considered the defendant's theory that it is the 
prevailing party and finds it unpersuasive. Under the case law 
recited in the defendant's brief, it is undoubtable that the 
plaintiff prevailed on the significant issues in this litigation 
and that the defendant's success (both in terms of monetary 
recovery and legal issues presented) was nominal. Further, unless 
and until it is proven that the jury's verdict was improper, this 
argument cannot provide a valid basis for reassigning prevailing 
party status. Therefore, the Court remains unconvinced that the 
STOUT V. CREEKSIDE 
EAST CONDO ASSOC. PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
defendant, rather than the plaintiff, can be considered the 
prevailing party. 
Next, the Court considers the defendant's argument that even 
if the plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorney's fees, the 
amount sought is unreasonable and excessive. Specifically, the 
defendant assails a number of entries in counsel's Affidavit as 
being duplicitous, unnecessary and excessive in terms of time and 
effort. Having reviewed these specific entries, the Court 
concludes that the defendant's objections are without merit and 
that a reduction in the fees is unwarranted. In fact, a number of 
the defendant's objections are based on the invalid argument that 
simply because a particular motion or legal endeavor pursued by 
the plaintiff was eventually unsuccessful, there should be no 
recovery for the time attributable thereto. However, it is the 
overall outcome that is determinative of prevailing party status 
and attorney fee recovery and not the success of each individual 
motion or legal effort. Further, the Court is unpersuaded that Mr. 
Sorensen's hourly fees should be reduced because of his minimal 
involvement with jury trials involving construction law. Mr. 
Sorensen's hourly fees are reasonable given his apparent expertise 
in construction law and the comparable fees charged by attorney's 
with similar practices and years of experience. Overall, the Court 
concludes that the attorney's fees and costs sought by the 
STOUT V. CREEKSIDE 
EAST CONDO ASSOC. PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
plaintiff aire reasonable and therefore declines to reduce the 
amounts sought by the almost 50% amount suggested by the defendant. 
This Minute Entry decision will') stand as the Order of the 
Court, awarding the plaintiff attorpiey's fees in the amount of 
$20,100 and costs in the amount of/$229.00. 
STOUT V. CREEKSIDE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry and Order, to the following, this, day 
of April, 2004: 
Gregory P. Hawkins 
Rick L. Sorensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
45 West 10000 South, Suite 309 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Loren M. Lambert 
Attorney for Defendant 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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EXHIBIT D 
Gregory P. Hawkins #4485 
Rick L. Sorensen #7631 
HAWKINS & SORENSEN 
Centennial Plaza, Suite 309 
45 West 10000 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801)233-0031 
Facsimile: (801)233-0032 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED DISTRICT : " i » ; 
Third Judicial r •;..:... 
SALT LAKE COV" 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OP-JUDGMENTS 
DATE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN F. STOUT doing business as 
PIONEER ROOFING CO. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030917317 DC 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
This matter came on for trial before the Court and a Jury, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
District Court Judge, presiding on December 9. 2003, and continued through December 10, 2003, 
and December 11,2003. Rick L. Sorensen of Hawkins & Sorensen, LC appeared for and on behalf 
of Plaintiff John F. Stout doing business as Pioneer Roofing Co. (hereinafter **Pioneer Roofing"). 
Loren M. Lambert of Arrow Legal Solutions, LLC appeared for and on behalf of Etefendant 
Creckside East Condominium Homeowners Association (hereinafter "Creekside"). The issues were 
duly tried and the Jury having duly rendered its verdict, Judgment &J 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that Plaintiff Pioneer Roofing recover from Defendant Creekside $27,665.00, plus interest 
thereon at the rate of 18%, as provided in the contract and pursuant to section 15-1 -4(2) of the Utah 
Code, from December 12, 2003, and continuing thereafter until paid and, as the prevailing party, 
Pioneer Roofing is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $20,100.00 and costs in the amount of 
$229,00 to be paid by Defendant Creekside for a total judgment in the amount of $47,994.00. ¥h» 
Judgment may be augmented in the amount uf aasunablc coats and attorney^ foes pursuant to Rule . 
-y^s&hg Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . - " ^ 
INFORMATION STATEMENT 
Name and Last-Known Address of Judgment Deb torts): 
a. Creekside East Condominium Homeowners Association, 5319 S. 560 E. No. A, 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Address at Which Judgment Debtorfs) Received Service of Process: 
a. 5319 S. 560 E. No. A, Murray, Utah 84107 
Name and Address of Judgment Creditor: 
a. John F. Stout, Pioneer Roofing, 7041 South 2700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Amount of Judgment Entered in Registry of Judgments: $47,994.00 
Debtor's Social Security Number: N/A 
Debtor's Date of Birth: N/A 
Debtor's Driver's License Number: N/A 
Status; No stay of enforcement has been ordered by the Court. 
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